Boardroom Centrality and Accounting Conservatism

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Project title

Code/計畫編號

MOST105-2410-H424-002

Translated Name/計畫中文名

董事會的會議室集中度與會計保守性

Project Coordinator/計畫主持人

Shu-Miao Lai

Funding Organization/主管機關

National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction

Department/Unit

Department of Accounting, KNU

Website

https://www.grb.gov.tw/search/planDetail?id=11894346

Year

2016

Start date/計畫起

01-08-2016

Expected Completion/計畫迄

31-07-2017

Bugetid/研究經費

439千元

ResearchField/研究領域

財政（含金融，保險）

本研究主要探討董事會的會議室集中度與會計保守性之關係。本文推論董事會的會議室集中度愈高，提供大量的資訊給予董事會成員產生資訊交換效果，進而影響董事會成員對會計保守性的需求。有關董事會的會議室集中度衡量則使用社會網絡理論的定義，本研究推測董事會的會議室集中度對會計保守性有顯著的影響。本文進一步探討董事會的會議室集中度所產生的資訊交換效果是否對需要大量資訊來監督的公司有更為明顯的效果。本研究推測當公司的成長機會愈多與資訊不對稱程度愈高時，董事會的會議室集中度對會計保守性之影響效果將會更加明顯。本研究提供董事會間的社會網絡關係如何影響董事會成員對會計保守性的監督利益之認知，進而影響董事會對會計保守性的需求之洞察。 This study investigates the effect of boardroom centrality on accounting conservatism. Social network theory suggests that through sharing board members, board connectedness allows information to be exchanged and transmitted. Well-connected directors transfer information about financial reporting practices and corporate policies through their interactions with directors from other corporate boards. This information could affect the knowledge of board members to understand the governance benefits of accounting conservatism. Thus, I posit that boardroom networks provide access to information, which affects boards’ demand for accounting conservatism. Using measures from social network theory that consider the entire boardroom network, I predict a signification association between boardroom centrality and accounting conservatism. Furthermore, I examine whether the association between boards’ well connectedness and accounting conservatism are more pronounced among firms that stand to benefit most from boardroom networks. I predict that the association between boards’ well connectedness and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among firms with high growth opportunities and information asymmetry. This study provides new insights into whether and how board connectedness affects the knowledge about the governance benefits of conservatism, thereby affecting demand for accounting conservatism.

Keyword(s)

董事會的社會網絡
會計保守性
公司董事會
公司治理
Board of director networks
accounting conservatism
boards of directors
corporate governance

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Boardroom Centrality and Accounting Conservatism

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