Effects of the optimal step toll scheme on equilibrium commuter behaviour

Abstract

This paper derives commuters' equilibrium queuing costs and equilibrium schedule delay costs before and after levying the optimal step tolls at a queuing bottleneck. Dealing with these equilibrium costs technically one can forecast some changes in equilibrium commuter behaviour from the no-toll to the optimal step toll cases. There is some useful information provided in this paper. First, the number of commuters who will or will not pay the tolls can be investigated before tolling a queuing bottleneck. Second, all commuters' departure time switching decisions from the no-toll to the tolled cases can be investigated before tolling. Third, the increased leisure time in the morning to the toll payer due to depart from home later than their original departure times in the no-toll case can be investigated before tolling. The above information of equilibrium commuter behaviour, which the related literature has failed to provide, is useful to policy-makers if the optimal step toll scheme is considered to be put into practice.